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Moral Rules, the Moral Sentiments,
and Behavior: Toward a Theory of an
Optimal Moral System
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell
Harvard University and National Bureau of Economic Research
How should moral sanctions and moral rewards—the moral senti-
ments involving feelings of guilt and of virtue—be employed togovern
individuals’ behavior if the objective is to maximize social welfare? In
the model that we examine, guilt is a disincentive to act and virtue is
an incentive because we assume that they are negative and positive
sources of utility. We also suppose that guilt and virtue are costly to
inculcate and are subject to certain constraints on their use. We show
that the moral sentiments should be used chieﬂy to control exter-
nalities and further that guilt is best to employ when most harmful
acts can successfully be deterred whereas virtue is best when only a
few individuals can be induced to behave well. We also contrast the
optimal use of guilt and virtue to optimal Pigouvian taxation and
discuss extensions of our analysis.
I. Introduction
The inﬂuence of morality on behavior has been a long-standing theme
of the analysis of human conduct. Adam Smith (1790), among others,
emphasized the motivational importance of the moral sentiments: feel-
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ings of guilt and of virtue along with their external correlates, disap-
probation and praise. Recent economic literature on social norms and
behavioral economics, such as that examining concerns for “fairness,”
recognizes that individuals’ actions are not always narrowly self-inter-
ested and may reﬂect moral concerns.
1 Likewise, signiﬁcant emerging
literatures in evolutionary biology and other disciplines address the role
of moral emotions in regulating behavior.
2 Against this background, we
assume here that individuals have the capacity to care about the morality
of their actions and accordingly that their decisions may be inﬂuenced
by moral factors.
The question that we examine is how a social planner would design
a system of morality to maximize social welfare, that is, how a social
planner would associate moral feelings with acts so as to induce behavior
that fosters social welfare. This is a natural question to pose for several
reasons. First, it seems that moral rules are to some degree malleable,
for we see that societies devote effort to inculcate moral views and that
these views vary across societies and over time. Second, many natural
and social scientists believe that our moral capacities are not accidental
but rather are the product of natural selection, serving the function of
furnishing humans with incentives to cooperate, to punish transgressors,
and to behave in additional ways that promote survival.
3 Third, the
systems of morality that actually exist appear in a broad sense to be
welfare enhancing, as Hume (1751), Sidgwick (1907), and others have
argued.
In our model, which we present in Section II, individuals decide
whether or not to commit various acts, some of which produce external
effects. Individuals are subject to a process of moral inculcation such
that they will experience moral sentiments—guilt and virtue—as a func-
tion of the choices they make. Accordingly, they will be led to behave
other than in their narrow self-interest if the weight of guilt or virtue
or both is sufﬁciently great. We assume that the inculcation process is
socially costly and that the capacity of individuals actually to experience
these moral sentiments is limited. We further assume that guilt and
virtue cannot be independently speciﬁed for every conceivable situation
but rather must be inculcated uniformly over certain subsets of acts.
(For example, the inculcation of guilt for lying cannot be so nuanced
that it results in a different level of guilt for each conceivable lie, but
1 See Hirshleifer (1987), Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1987), Frank (1988), Rabin
(1993), Ben-Ner and Putterman (1998), Binmore (1998), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Ak-
erlof and Kranton (2000), Becker and Murphy (2000), and Robson (2001).
2 See Darwin (1872, 1874), Trivers (1971), Campbell (1975), E. O. Wilson (1975), Al-
exander (1987), Daly and Wilson (1988), Izard (1991), Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby
(1992), J. Q. Wilson (1993), Baron (1994), Damasio (1994), LeDoux (1996), Pinker
(1997), Elster (1998), Haidt (2001), Massey (2002), Cohen (2005), and Hauser (2006).
3 See the references in note 2.496 journal of political economy
rather must be the same within certain categories of lies.) The social
objective is taken to be maximization of morally inclusive social welfare,
which is to say conventional social welfare—the utility that individuals
obtain directly from the acts that they commit and the utility conse-
quences of any external effects of these acts—combined with morally
related components of social welfare—the cost of instilling the moral
sentiments and the disutility or utility associated with experiencing
them.
We analyze the optimal system of morality in Section III. We ﬁnd that
the moral sentiments are used chieﬂy to control individuals’ behavior
when otherwise it would not be ﬁrst-best because of externalities.
4 How-
ever, the moral sentiments can only imperfectly correct behavior that
generates externalities, because of the cost of inculcating the moral
sentiments, limits on the capacity of individuals to experience them,
and also the need to instill guilt and virtue at uniform levels over groups
of acts that may exhibit heterogeneity. Regarding the latter, suppose
that most but not all acts in a group are undesirable; then some desirable
acts in the group may be deterred by the moral sentiments, and other
desirable acts will be committed but result in individuals’ feeling guilty
as a consequence. An additional conclusion is that, for a variety of
reasons, the optimal level of the moral sanctions may be lower or higher
than a Pigouvian tax benchmark, under which moral sanctions would
be set equal to the level of the relevant expected externality. That is,
moral leniency or moral harshness can be optimal.
A further conclusion concerns the optimal choice between the use
of guilt and of virtue. Because individuals are assumed to have a limited
capacity to experience these sentiments, it is best to use them in such
a manner that they are actually experienced infrequently. Hence, guilt
is best to employ when most violations of moral rules can be successfully
deterred, whereas virtue is best to employ when few individuals can be
induced to follow a moral rule. In other words, it is optimal for worse-
than-normal moral behavior to be punished and for unusually good
moral behavior to be rewarded.
In Section IV, we consider possible extensions of our analysis, and in
Section V we comment on the consistency of our conclusions with the
observed features of moral systems.
5
4 The externalities might be positive, such as when virtue is usedtoencourageindividuals
to help others in distress or guilt is used to induce people to contribute to the provision
of public goods rather than to free ride.
5 On the connection between our analysis and moral philosophy, see Kaplow andShavell
(2001, 2002).moral rules 497
II. Model
Let S denote the set of possible situations in which individuals may ﬁnd
themselves. In each situation, an individual chooses between committing
some act and not doing so. For example, in one situation, an individual
might choose whether or not to lie, in another whether or not to litter,
and in another whether or not to read a book.
If in any particular situation an individual commits the act, the in-
dividual obtains (positive or negative) utility u, which we sometimes
refer to as conventional utility. The commission of an act causes an
external harm of . Note that this assumption allows acts with no h ≥ 0
external effects, and it also implicitly accommodates acts with beneﬁcial
external effects (through appropriate labeling of acts).
6 If the individual
does not commit the act, he does not obtain any conventional utility
and does not cause any external harm (these assumptions are purely a
normalization in that only the difference in utility and externalities
caused by acts versus inaction is relevant).
A situation in S may thus be identiﬁed with a pair (u, h) describing
the act that an individual may choose to commit. The possible situations
have density , which is assumed to be continuous, where u is in f(u, h)
(, ) and h is in [0, ).
Assume that society may instill the predisposition to experience guilt
for committing an act in situation (u, h). That is, a person g(u, h) ≥ 0
in situation (u, h) will experience guilt and suffer disutility of if g(u, h)
and only if he commits the act. Similarly, assume that society may instill
the predisposition to experience virtue for not committing v(u, h) ≥ 0
an act in situation (u, h). That is, a person in situation (u, h) will obtain
utility of if and only if he does not commit the act. v(u, h)
The prospect of experiencing guilt or virtue may lead an individual
to change his behavior.
7 In the absence of guilt and virtue, an individual
in a given situation will commit the act if and only if .
8 When guilt u 1 0
is instilled for acting and virtue for not acting, an indi- g(u, h) v(u, h)
vidual will act if and only if the overall utility from acting exceeds the
6 For example, failing to assist others can be labeled “acting,” which causes a negative
externality ( ) relative to “not acting,” in this case, assisting others. (Assuming that h 1 0
does involve some restriction given our later assumption about the grouping of acts; h ≥ 0
relaxing the assumption that h is nonnegative would not, however, affect the qualitative
nature of our conclusions.)
7 It is not important for our analysis how individuals actually conceive of guilt and of
virtue, i.e., whether moral considerations are in some psychological sense different from
sources of conventional utility. It is likely, however, that moral considerations do have
distinctive psychological attributes. Many of the references cited in note 2 characterize
the moral sentiments as emotions, although that literature varies considerably in how
these emotions are labeled, which of these are viewed as purely internal and external,
and other respects.
8 For convenience, we assume throughout that individuals do not act when they are
indifferent.498 journal of political economy
utility from not acting, that is, if and only if , or u  g(u, h) 1 v(u, h)
, which is to say that conventional utility exceeds u 1 g(u, h)  v(u, h)
the sum of the moral sanction and reward that favor not acting.
We make three assumptions about guilt and virtue. First, when guilt
and virtue are instilled, they are constrained to be the same for all
situations within each of n exogenously given subsets that partition Si
the universe S of situations. Let and denote the uniform levels of gv ii
guilt and of virtue for situations within . Furthermore, let denote Sf (u, h) ii
the conditional density of (u, h) on , and let be the probability that Sp ii
a situation is in . Si
The motivation for the assumption that guilt and virtue are constant
for each is that it is difﬁcult to instill guilt and virtue in a completely Si
tailored manner. As we discuss in Section IV.A below, a more elaborate
model might allow the determination of the to be endogenous, by Si
permitting greater reﬁnements of the at an additional cost; but as Si
long as perfect reﬁnement is not optimal, our conclusions would not
be affected.
Second, there is a cost of instilling guilt and virtue. Speciﬁcally, gi
may be instilled on each subset at cost , where and
  S a(g ) a(g ) 1 0 ii i i i
. Similarly, may be instilled at cost , where and
     a (g ) ≥ 0 v b(v) b(v) 1 0 ii i i i i i
.
9    b (v) ≥ 0 ii
Third, there is a limit to individuals’ capacity to experience guilt and
virtue. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the expected value of experienced
guilt cannot exceed and the expected value of experienced virtue G ≥ 0
cannot exceed . V ≥ 0
The motivation for positing this limitation derives from human psy-
chology. With regard to a range of feelings and stimuli, our neurological
systems tend to become less sensitive or even numb to repetition of the
same experience. This phenomenon suggests that there would be a
“crowding-out” effect on further feelings of guilt or virtue as their fre-
quency and magnitude increase.
10 It would be cumbersome to take the
foregoing explicitly into account, and doing so would not alter the
qualitative nature of the conclusions that we derive using the afore-
mentioned simple constraints on experienced G and V. (An alternative
9 Instead, one could assume that the total of guilt and virtue inculcated mightdetermine
the cost, and one could also incorporate a crowding-out phenomenon, in which spending
more time to inculcate guilt or virtue for some types of acts leaves less inculcation time
(or less effective time) for other types of acts. However, because we do not specify the
level of inculcation costs and because our constraints on the experiencing of guilt and
virtue (described next) have an aggregate form, introducing trade-offs among acts in the
inculcation process would not change our results signiﬁcantly.
10 For example, Frederick and Loewenstein (1999) suggest that there is a substantial
(although not universal) regularity in the tendency of mental reactions to stimuli to fall
as the stimuli are repeated. Our approach in this regard is similar in spirit to that advanced
in Rayo and Becker (2007).moral rules 499
version of our model under which the increased use of guilt or virtue
decreases its marginal effectiveness is sketched in the margin.
11) We also
note that these constraints will be seen to have importance in regard
to the choice between the use of guilt and of virtue.
Social welfare is taken to be the expected value of the conventional
utility that individuals experience from committing acts, plus any real-
ized virtue and minus any realized guilt, minus external harm, and
minus the costs of instilling guilt and virtue. (Although we adopt a
utilitarian framework, our conclusions would be essentially the same
under a variety of other frameworks.
12) As noted in the introduction,
we refer to this measure as morally inclusive social welfare to distinguish
it from the standard formulation of social welfare that incorporates only
conventional utility and externalities. In the familiar ﬁrst-best solution
to the usual problem of social welfare maximization, an act in a situation
is committed if and only if . u 1 h
III. Analysis
The social problem is to choose and on the subsets to g ≥ 0 v ≥ 0 S ii i
maximize social welfare, subject to the constraints on the realization of
guilt and virtue. Social welfare is
13
11 We let continue to indicate how much guilt is inculcated for situations in , but gS i i
we introduce a separate term, , to indicate effective guilt—the level of disutility— g(g, G) ii
which in turn inﬂuences behavior. (Thus, in a model with guilt only, an individualcommits
an act if and only if .) In this formulation, G is not a constraint on guilt that may u 1 gi
be experienced but rather refers to the total amount of guilt that will be experienced.
Finally, assume that is increasing in and decreasing in G. For example, one might g g ii
have . Then, if more guilt is used on subset , G will increase, which g(g, G) p g/(1 G) S ii i i
will decrease the effectiveness of guilt in controlling all behavior. The ﬁrst-orderconditions
for this model are similar to (5) and (6) below. The primary difference is that the shadow
prices would be replaced by terms reﬂecting an increasing marginal cost of experienced
guilt or virtue (corresponding to the diminished marginal effectiveness of guilt or virtue
that is already employed to control other acts). Additionally, in such a model—in which
guilt and virtue are not literally ﬁxed in supply—the fact that experiencing guilt and virtue
affects welfare would have a more clearly identiﬁable effect on the optimum: Ceteris
paribus, this consideration favors using less guilt and more virtue than otherwise.
12 Our measure of external harm h, conceived here as the aggregate reduction in others’
utilities, could also be interpreted as a nonwelfarist measure of social harm from an act,
such as from rights violations. Likewise, our results do not depend on the particularchoice
of an additive welfare function; it would be sufﬁcient for social welfare to depend positively
on different individuals’ u’s, negatively on h, and so forth.
13 Expression (1) may be interpreted as the welfare of a representative individual. Al-
ternatively, expression (1) may be interpreted as the average welfare of a group of possibly
heterogeneous individuals, an extension that we discuss in Section IV.C. In this case,
however, the constraints (2) and (3) would need to be formulated somewhat differently.500 journal of political economy
 nn
W(g , v) p p (u  h  g )f(u, h)dudh  ii i i ii {[
ip1 ip1 0 g v ii
 g v ii
 vf (u, h)dudh a(g )  b(v). ( 1 )  ii i i i i ]}
0 
To explain, individuals commit acts in situations in subset when Si
, in which case the effect on social welfare is because u 1 g  vu  h  g ii i
both conventional utility and guilt are experienced by the individual
committing an act and the externality occurs; when individuals do not
commit acts, they obtain utility of ; and the costs of instilling and vg ii
are subtracted. The constraints on the realization of guilt and virtue vi
are
 nn
y(g , v) p pg f (u, h)dudh  ii i i  ii []
ip1 ip1 0 g v ii
n
p pg[1  F(g  v)] ≤ G (2)  ii i i i
ip1
and
 g v ii nn
z (g , v) p pv f (u, h)dudh  ii i i  ii []
ip1 ip1 0 
n
p pvF(g  v) ≤ V. (3)  iii i i
ip1
Here, and are, respectively, expected experienced guilt y(g , v) z (g , v) ii i ii i
and virtue from situations in ; is the frequency with which SF (g  v) ii i i
on the subset , that is, the fraction of acts in that are u ≤ g  vS S ii i i
deterred; and, correspondingly, is the fraction of acts in 1  F(g  v) ii i
that are committed. Si
The Lagrangian for the problem of maximizing welfare (1) subject
to the constraints (2) and (3) is
nn n
W(g , v)  l y(g , v)  G m z (g , v)  V , (4)   ii i ii i ii i [] []
ip1 ip1 ip1
where l and m are the multipliers for the constraints on the use of guiltmoral rules 501
and virtue. The ﬁrst-order condition if the optimal level of guilt on g* i
subset is positive is
14 Si

  p (h  lg  mv)f(g  v,h)dh  (1  l)[1  F(g  v)] p a(g ), i ii i i i i i i i i []
0
(5)
and the ﬁrst-order condition if the optimal level of is positive is v* i

  p (h  lg  mv)f(g  v, h)dh  (1  m)F(g  v) p b(v). (6) i ii i i i i i i i i []
0
The two terms in brackets on the left sides of (5) and (6) correspond
to marginal and inframarginal effects of raising and . The ﬁrst gv ii
(integral) terms reﬂect the marginal net beneﬁt of deterring additional
acts. When or is raised slightly, the marginal acts that are deterred gv ii
are those for which ; hence, with regard to the utility ex- u p g  v ii
perienced by an individual with an act just at the margin, deterrence
has no effect on social welfare. However, when an act is deterred, the
external harm h is also avoided. Moreover, when an act is deterred, the
fact that the individual no longer experiences relaxes the constraint gi
on the use of guilt by that amount, which has an implicit value per unit
of l. But the individual now experiences , which tightens the constraint vi
on the use of virtue by that amount, which has an implicit cost per unit
of m. Each of these marginal beneﬁts and costs is weighted by
, the density of acts deterred at the margin. f(g  v, h) ii i
The second terms in brackets in (5) and (6) are the inframarginal
effects on welfare of raising and , respectively. For those acts that gv ii
are not deterred, whose relative proportion in the subset is Si
, there are two costs of raising : Individuals suffer an 1  F(g  v) g ii i i
additional unit of guilt, and an additional unit of the constrained pool
of guilt is used. Likewise, for those acts that are deterred, whose relative
proportion in the subset is , raising has two effects: In- SF (g  v) v ii i i i
dividuals experience an additional unit of virtue and an additional unit
of the constrained pool of virtue is used.
These two types of effects, the marginal (or deterrence) effects and
the inframarginal effects, are equated with the direct marginal cost of
instilling a higher level of guilt or of virtue, as the case may be.
14 As will be apparent from the discussion to follow, and are each possible. g* p 0 v* p 0 ii
In addition, the ﬁrst-order conditions are not sufﬁcient conditions for a global optimum.502 journal of political economy
A. Basic Results
We now state characteristics of the optimum; these are proved in the
Appendix.
Proposition. For each subset , the following conditions hold: Si
a. Neither positive guilt nor positive virtue is instilled unless g* v* ii
there exists a subset of situations in having positive probability Si
for which individuals otherwise would act ( ) but for which u 1 0
acting is not ﬁrst-best ( )—provided that, at the optimum, u ! h
.
  b(0) 1 (1  m)p ii
b. Both possible types of deviations from ﬁrst-best behavior may occur:
the commission of undesirable acts and the deterrence of desirable
acts.
c. If , guilt may sometimes be experienced; if , virtue may g* 1 0 v* 1 0 i i
not always be experienced.
Part a states the chief point motivating this article, that the moral
sentiments are instilled in order to control socially undesirable behavior.
That is, guilt or virtue will be used for a subset only if there exist acts Si
in that it would be desirable to deter. If we consider guilt alone, the Si
reason for this conclusion is clear: Because guilt is costly to inculcate
and involves costs if it is ever experienced, there must be some behav-
ioral beneﬁt—some acts that it is desirable to deter—for guilt to be
socially desirable to inculcate. If we consider virtue as well, however, the
argument for the conclusion must take into account that the experi-
encing of virtue is itself a source of utility. This point raises the possibility
that it would be optimal to instill virtue solely because of the beneﬁt of
its being experienced. Our condition that is sufﬁcient
  b(0) 1 (1  m)p ii
to rule out this possibility. Either the marginal inculcation cost can be
sufﬁciently high ( will sufﬁce) or the constraint (3) on the use
  b(0) 1 p ii
of virtue can be sufﬁciently binding ( ), or some less demanding m 1 1
combination of the two. (Regarding the constraint, observe that if virtue
is sufﬁciently scarce, the only question is where to use virtue rather than
how much total virtue to use, and it will tend to be optimal to use virtue
where the beneﬁts of controlling behavior are the greatest relative to
how much virtue must be used; see subsection C below.)
With regard to part b, undesirable acts may be committed because
and are not sufﬁcient to deter them, which may arise because g* v* ii
inculcation costs are high or because guilt and virtue are scarce. The
possibility that desirable acts may be deterred is a consequence of the
grouping of acts, that is, the need for guilt and virtue to be uniform
within each subset of situations. Although most acts in a subset may SS i i
be undesirable, making it optimal to use guilt or virtue to deter them,
there may be some acts in the subset with atypically low h (for instance,
). h p 0moral rules 503
Part c states that, even when it is optimal to use guilt or virtue or
both, they may not always succeed in controlling behavior. This con-
clusion is a further consequence of the grouping of acts into subsets
. For example, most acts in a subset may be quite harmful and produce Si
little conventional utility, making it desirable to deter them with some
combination of guilt and virtue. Nevertheless, a few acts in the subset
may yield very high conventional utility, in which case these acts may
well be committed and thus guilt rather than virtue would then be
experienced—unless a very high combined level of guilt and virtue is
employed, but that may be too costly.
B. Comparison of the Optimal Levels of Guilt and Virtue to the Optimal
Level of a Pigouvian Tax
It is of interest to compare the optimal use of guilt and virtue to control
externalities, as described above, with the optimal Pigouvian tax. It may
be best for the moral incentive—the sum of guilt and virtue, — g*  v* ii
to be either below or above the Pigouvian tax benchmark, namely,
, the expected level of the externality on .
15 The case in which E(hdS) S ii
the optimal moral incentive is below expected harm may arise because
of the cost of instilling guilt and virtue and because of the constraints
on their use (and, regarding guilt, also because of the utility cost of its
being experienced by individuals). An implication is that or g* p 0 i
(or both) is possible even when there exist acts in that ideally v* p 0 S i i
should be deterred. The case in which the optimal moral incentive
exceeds expected harm may occur because raising deterrence may re-
duce the application of moral sanctions, which as noted is costly.
16
15 Our exposition involves an oversimpliﬁcation in the case in which harm is not in-
dependent of the utility of the externality-causing activity; the reader may interpret our
remarks for the case of independence or add the appropriate adjustments to our
exposition.
16 More precisely, consider a subset in which only guilt is used: Raising will reduce gi
the aggregate amount of guilt that is experienced when the deterrent effect exceeds the
inframarginal effect, i.e., when . To illustrate the claim in the text, sup- gf(g) 1 1  F(g) ii i i i
pose further that the only situations for which are those in which u is just slightly u 1 h
above h. Then it may be optimal to deter all such acts by setting equal to the highest gi
level of u. The deterred acts involve a direct social loss of , which is assumed to be u  h
small; suppose further that the marginal cost of raising is not large. These social costs gi
may be less than the beneﬁts arising from individuals not experiencing . (Observe that gi
if were set equal to the expected harm, then raising slightly would involve a loss in gg i i
conventional utility equal to the expected harm—just as in the case of a Pigouvian tax—
but a savings of the expected harm plus , which at that point itself equals the expected gi
harm, plus a possible further beneﬁt from relaxing the guilt constraint.)504 journal of political economy
C. Choice between the Use of Guilt and Virtue as Incentives
Comparison of the ﬁrst-order conditions (5) and (6) for the optimal
use of guilt and of virtue sheds light on whether it is optimal to rely
primarily (or exclusively) on guilt or primarily on virtue to control
behavior in a subset . The marginal net beneﬁts of using guilt and Si
virtue—the ﬁrst terms on the left sides of (5) and (6)—are identical,
reﬂecting the fact that they are substitutes as deterrents. The marginal
inculcation costs—the right sides of (5) and (6)—are symmetric, so this
consideration favors using whichever sentiment, guilt or virtue, has the
lower marginal inculcation cost. So far, therefore, there is no qualitative
difference between the desirability of guilt and of virtue as incentives.
However, consideration of the inframarginal effects of using guilt and
virtue—the second terms on the left sides of (5) and (6)—suggests an
important distinction. In what we take as our benchmark, the case in
which at the optimum, both second terms are negative, indicating m 1 1
that greater experiencing of both guilt and virtue is costly. But in general
the amounts of guilt and virtue experienced are not the same: For guilt,
the fraction experienced is , and for virtue, the fraction 1  F(g  v) ii i
experienced is . Thus, when most individuals will be deterred F(g  v) ii i
from committing acts in , so that is large, very little guilt will actually SF ii
be experienced, whereas a signiﬁcant amount of virtue will be experi-
enced (each per unit inculcated). Accordingly, when most acts in will Si
be deterred, it will tend to be optimal to use guilt and not virtue. Like-
wise, when few acts in will be deterred, so that is small, it will tend SF ii
to be optimal to use virtue and not guilt. Moreover, because the effect
of raising or on inframarginal costs may be large even when, initially, gv ii
or , it may well be optimal to rely exclusively on guilt in g p 0 v p 0 ii
the former case and exclusively on virtue in the latter case.
IV. Discussion
A. Grouping of Situations
We assumed that the universe of situations S is exogenously divided into
distinct subsets . An important reason to view acts as falling into groups Si
rather than being considered individually is that the basic nature of
perception and cognition is thought to be categorical (see, e.g., Kosslyn
and Koenig 1992; Pinker 1997). (It is therefore not surprising that econ-
omists have begun to study categorical thinking in various settings; see,
e.g., Mullainathan 2002; Fryer and Jackson 2007.)
Another reason favoring the assumption that the moral sentiments
are inculcated over groups rather than act by act is that the former is
advantageous in light of a number of concerns about the application
of moral rules. More act-speciﬁc rules require more information tomoral rules 505
apply, the information may not always be available, and even when
present, it is costly to process. Further, the proper functioning of the
moral emotions requires that their application be largely automatic. If,
instead, whether one ultimately feels guilty depends on a conscious,
complex assessment of highly context-speciﬁc information, the ability
to rationalize in one’s self-interest would often lead individuals not to
feel guilty when they should, that is, when it would be socially desirable
for them to refrain from actions that advance narrow self-interest. This
phenomenon would undermine the function of guilt in regulating be-
havior that harms others.
In addition to these beneﬁts of grouping with regard to the appli-
cation of moral rules, the inculcation process itself may be more efﬁcient
and effective when acts are grouped into categories. There may be scale
economies and related savings of time and effort in teaching broader,
if somewhat imprecise, lessons than in attempting to treat every con-
ceivable future situation as distinctive. Moreover, the fact that moral
rules are inculcated to a signiﬁcant degree during childhood favors the
use of categories.
It does not follow, however, from the foregoing that the groups of
situations that are treated as morally equivalent are entirely ﬁxed. Si
Hence, a natural extension of our model would allow for choice as to
the breadth of categories over which to inculcate guilt and virtue or for
the inculcation of exceptions to general moral rules. Obviously, the
greater the heterogeneity of acts within a group , the greater would Si
be the beneﬁts of a ﬁner partition of situations. Nevertheless, given the
many factors that favor grouping, it seems clear that allowing the group-
ings to be endogenous, optimizing on all relevant margins in light of
residual human limitations, would not alter our basic conclusions. Spe-
ciﬁcally, some grouping would be optimal, and within the optimal cat-
egories, all our results would hold.
We also assumed that the subsets over which guilt and virtue are
inculcated are distinct, but in reality they may overlap. An interesting
case of overlap occurs because moral rules that have a particular focus,
such as those directed against lying or stealing, are accompanied by a
more general moral rule, notably the Golden Rule, which broadly en-
joins individuals to take into account the effects of their behavior on
others. One can understand the Golden Rule as associating guilt with
all undesirable acts and virtue with all desirable acts, perhaps with the
levels of guilt and virtue rising with the extent of negative and positive
externalities. This consideration raises the question why society does
not simply inculcate the Golden Rule, eschewing all other rules, and
thereby attempt to induce all individuals always to act in a socially op-
timal manner. The answer may lie in the reasons given for grouping in
the previous paragraphs, including problems of complex calculations,506 journal of political economy
susceptibility to self-interested rationalization, and the difﬁculty of in-
structing young children. Additionally, recent research, such as that
summarized by Cosmides and Tooby (1994), suggests that the human
mind may perform better in specialized rather than in general problem
solving. Moreover, our analysis suggests that, even if successful, such an
approach would be problematic if the associated levels of guilt or virtue
were high because of the constraints on the ability to experience the
moral emotions. For example, many individuals would still commit un-
desirable acts, which would quickly consume the scarce pool of guilt,
making it difﬁcult to deter those acts that are particularly important to
control.
B. Internal versus External Sanctions and Rewards
Corresponding to the internal mechanisms of guilt and virtue, there
are external sanctions and rewards, namely, disapprobation or blame
and approbation or praise.
17 These external analogues to the moral
sentiments complement guilt and virtue in regulating individuals’ be-
havior. Despite the similarities between these internal and external sanc-
tions (taken in what follows to include rewards), a more complete anal-
ysis would also account for their differences.
External sanctions involve the actions of third parties, sometimes vic-
tims (or, in the case of helpful acts, beneﬁciaries) but often unrelated
individuals. This requirement implies that there are three prerequisites
for external sanctions to be effective: The individuals imposing the sanc-
tions need information about the actor’s behavior, they must be moti-
vated to mete out the sanctions, and the actor must care about others’
expressions of blame and praise. The third element is closely related
to the internal sanctions and rewards of guilt and virtue: It seems that
those who would feel guilty committing an act would usually feel badly
if others express disapproval, and conversely. The second element, in-
dividuals’ motivation to impose sanctions on actors, cannot be taken
for granted. One explanation for individuals’ motivation in this regard
is that the very process by which, for example, guilt may be inculcated
for committing a particular type of act would lead an individual to
express disapproval of others’ commission of the same type of act.
18 The
ﬁrst element, third parties’ information, will sometimes arise automat-
17 Prior work by economists on social sanctions for failure to adhere to social norms
includes Akerlof (1980) and Bernheim (1994). Smith (1790) devoted signiﬁcant attention
to the similarities and differences between internal and external moral sanctions and
rewards.
18 For example, Fehr and Ga ¨chter (2002) present evidence that negative emotions trig-
gered by antisocial behavior motivate punishment of third parties; this reaction is antic-
ipated, thereby inducing cooperation. Cohen (2005) discusses evidence that emotions
explain the rejection of low offers in the ultimatum game.moral rules 507
ically but often will involve associated activity, such as gossip, which itself
requires motivation. One could model disapprobation and approbation
explicitly using our framework by deﬁning such behavior as involving
additional subsets of acts, which themselves might have moral sentiments
associated with them.
C. Heterogeneity of Actors
Our model presumed that individuals were identical, but it could easily
be modiﬁed to accommodate a heterogeneous population of individ-
uals. If individuals’ utilities from acts or the external effects of their acts
differ, the acts of different individuals can be labeled as distinct acts. In
this case, different distributions of the likelihood of situations would be
associated with different individuals. These distributions could then be
aggregated across the population, and our social welfare maximization
problem would refer to the average expected utility of individuals rather
than to the expected utility of a single, representative individual. A
complication is that the constraints on the experiencing of guilt and
virtue would then apply separately to each individual.
Another important source of heterogeneity is that different individ-
uals may be differentially susceptible to feelings of guilt and virtue. This
could be due to differences in their constitution or differences in their
upbringing. Izard (1991) indicates genetic differences in individuals’
susceptibility to emotions. With regard to inculcation, since much of it
is done by parents or local institutions, the potential for variation is
substantial. Relatedly, as Akerlof and Kranton (2000) emphasize, indi-
viduals to an extent choose among different personal identities; these
different identities, in turn, will tend to be associated with different
norms and different internal and external sanctions. To model this
heterogeneity, one could allow for a distribution of types with regard
to individuals’ personal sensitivity to guilt and virtue or to the degree
to which inculcation succeeds. This, too, would not greatly alter the
nature of our conclusions. The primary effect of actor heterogeneity
on our analysis would be to augment the impact of the grouping of
situations that themselves are heterogeneous.
D. Prudence
Although our analysis suggests that moral sanctions should be employed
only when externalities are present, discussions of virtue and vice over
the ages have often included categories of acts that seem to involve only
self-regarding behavior. Moreover, psychologists have found that indi-
viduals experience guilt when they act in ways that harm only themselves
(see Izard 1991). For example, individuals are urged to save for a rainy508 journal of political economy
day, not to overeat, and otherwise to protect themselves from their own
folly, and individuals who fail to do these things may feel guilty. The
primary explanation for such use of moral sanctions appears to be in-
dividuals’ potential lack of self-control. In particular, many instances in
which guilt and virtue seem to be associated with self-regarding behavior
involve problems of myopia (hyperbolic discounting). These problems
can be conceived as involving two selves, a present self whose decisions
negatively affect a future self—as Thaler and Shefrin (1981), Schelling
(1984), and many others have suggested. Under such a formulation,
the behavior of the present self creates an externality, affecting a dif-
ferent self, and hence our analysis suggesting the potential beneﬁts of
employing guilt and virtue is relevant. An interesting application that
involves self-control problems, the use of external sanctions, and Akerlof
and Kranton’s (2000) view that individuals to an extent choose their
own identities, is the decision of some individuals to join groups such
as Alcoholics Anonymous in order to raise the moral sanctions on their
own self-destructive behavior.
E. Evolution and Inculcation
The general capacity to experience guilt and virtue—as distinct from
how that capacity may be employed in a given society—must have an
evolutionary origin, just as does any other capacity we might have (see,
e.g., Darwin 1874; E. O. Wilson 1975; Izard 1991). The ability of indi-
viduals to learn associations between actions and emotions and subse-
quently to have their behavior inﬂuenced by their emotions is well
supported by recent work in the social and natural sciences.
19 That
human nature is indeed programmable in this sense is further implied
by the substantial efforts devoted to inculcating guilt and virtue to en-
force various moral rules in the rearing of children, in organized reli-
gion, in educational institutions, and in some acts of government. The
possibility of inculcation, moreover, is important in attempting to ex-
plain cross-cultural variation in moral rules as well as their rate of change
over time, which seems greatly to exceed the rate of biological evolution
(see, e.g., Izard 1991; Nisbett and Cohen 1996).
It does not follow, of course, that the moral sentiments will in fact
be employed in a manner that maximizes social welfare. First, biological
19 See many of the references cited in note 2. For example, Massey (2002) surveys
literature in evolutionary psychology and neurology in explaining how implicit memories
are created by the pairing of external stimuli with hard-wired emotions so that, when the
relevant stimuli are subsequently experienced, emotions are triggered; these responses
occur even before the mind is able to begin rational analysis of the situation. Moreover,
these links between stimuli and emotions inﬂuence cognition and are highly durable and
thus difﬁcult to eliminate.moral rules 509
evolution tends to maximize survival (more precisely, replication of the
pertinent genes) rather than welfare, although it may well be the case
that in societies not on the brink of subsistence, inculcation will reﬂect
an interest in maximizing welfare. Second, it may not be society’s overall
welfare that is maximized by morality. Parents may be concerned pri-
marily with their family’s well-being, religious or other organizations
with the welfare of their members, and so forth. Nevertheless, there
often is overlap: Teaching simple rules (do not lie or steal, do not free
ride) to children to regulate behavior within the family may spill over
to future interactions with others, and parents may teach more altruistic
rules because individuals known to be honest and cooperative may face
better opportunities in society at large. Third, maximization is not as-
sured. With evolution, there is the familiar point that selection is fun-
damentally at the level of individual genes, so traits that would beneﬁt
a group as a whole may not emerge (although they may arise to some
extent through kin selection and reciprocity). With inculcation, there
is the problem that inculcators do not bear all the costs and beneﬁts
of their actions. For example, when there are multiple inculcators (fam-
ily, religious institutions, and government), each may impose external-
ities on others through excessive use of the scarce capacity to experience
guilt and virtue, a sort of common-pool problem.
V. Conclusion
Our analysis offers a theory of how moral sanctions and rewards—feel-
ings of guilt and virtue—would best be employed if the purpose were
to maximize social welfare. Although beyond the scope of the present
inquiry, it is natural to ask whether common morality is roughly con-
sistent with our results. One would not predict a close ﬁt because, as
we discuss in Section IV.E, the processes that produce common morality
hardly guarantee optimality and may not involve the maximization of
social welfare in particular. Furthermore, our model considers morality
in isolation from other social methods of controlling behavior, whereas
the optimal use of morality will depend on the availability of other
instruments, notably, the legal system, regulation, and taxes and sub-
sidies (see Shavell 2002). Nevertheless, since our model and results are
basic, one might expect them to possess a measure of explanatory power.
Most obviously, it is indeed the case that behavior censured as immoral
(lying, stealing) tends to be socially undesirable because of negative
externalities, and behavior deemed morally praiseworthy (rescue) tends
to be socially desirable because of positive externalities. In addition,
many moral rules (such as those concerning lies, promises, and ag-
gression) apply to groups of related acts; even when there are exceptions
or other reﬁnements, moral rules apply to categories rather than there510 journal of political economy
existing separate rules ﬁnely tailored to the particulars of each possible
situation. Moreover, it has long been recognized that certain acts (such
as lies in speciﬁc circumstances) might be considered immoral despite
their being socially desirable. Hence, individuals may sometimes be de-
terred by the prospect of moral sanctions from committing desirable
acts, and others may sometimes feel guilty for committing acts that are
in fact socially desirable. Additionally, regarding our result that optimal
moral sanctions may be below or above the Pigouvian tax benchmark,
it does seem that moral sanctions seem lenient for some types of acts
in some moral systems and excessive for other types.
Furthermore, the observed choice in moral systems whether to rely
primarily on guilt or on virtue seems to be in accord with our model,
which indicates that limits on individuals’ capacities to experience guilt
and virtue make it optimal to employ whichever one would least need
to be actually experienced. Thus, individuals who fail to comply with
rules that are usually followed (such as norms against cutting in line or
unprovoked aggression) tend to feel guilty, rather than the majority who
routinely comply continually feeling virtuous. Likewise, individuals who
engage in unusual acts of sacriﬁce to help others do seem to feel virtuous
and are subject to praise, rather than most people who, say, fail to devote
the majority of their wealth to help those less fortunate always feeling
guilty and being subject to pervasive disapprobation.
We also note that, in principle, our model could be employed to help
understand the frequently noted differences in moral systems across
cultures and over time. Because of differences both in the relative im-
portance of various external harms and beneﬁts and in the role and
effectiveness of systems of inculcating morality (religious institutions
versus government versus families), one would not expect systems of
common morality to be the same. Although measuring the relevant
parameters would be quite difﬁcult, it may still be possible to illuminate
recognized variations by using a framework like ours that relates moral
systems to underlying social conditions.
One could also attempt to employ a model like ours to analyze how
certain government policies (e.g., laws having symbolic effects, such as
civil rights legislation) may be used to reinforce or modify common
morality. Our analysis suggests the importance of such inquiries but also
raises some cautions. Notably, increasing the level of guilt and social
disapprobation associated with socially undesirable behavior may be
beneﬁcial by deterring it, but it also may be costly to the extent that it
is not fully successful: Experiencing guilt involves a direct cost and, given
the scarcity of individuals’ capacities to experience the moral sentiments,
may reduce their effectiveness in controlling other behavior. Further-
more, when families, religious and educational institutions, and themoral rules 511
government all compete in attempting to use this scarce common re-
source for their own ends, the results are unlikely to be optimal.
Appendix
Proof of the Proposition
Part a.—We ﬁrst observe that, from expression (4), we know that and g* v* ii
must maximize . Thus neither nor W(g , v)ly(g , v)mz (g , v) g 1 0 v 1 0 ii i ii i ii i i i
can be optimal if the following expression is positive for all postulated optimal
nonzero pairs :
20 (g , v) ≥ 0 ii
[W(0, 0)ly(0, 0)mz (0, 0)][W(g , v)ly(g , v)mz (g , v)] i i i i ii i ii i ii
 g v ii
p p (uh)f(u, h)dudh[a(g )a(0)][b(v)b(0)] i ii i i i i i
00
p(1 l)g [1 F(g v)] p(1 m)vF(g v). (A1) ii i i i ii i i i
Now suppose, contrary to the assumption of part a of the proposition, that there
does not exist a subset of situations in having positive probability for which Si
individuals otherwise would act ( ) but acting is not ﬁrst-best ( ). That u 1 0 u ! h
is, suppose that or for all (u, h) in (except possibly on a set of u ≤ 0 u ≥ hS i
measure zero). In this case, it can be shown that (A1) is positive for any pos-
tulated optimal nonzero pair ( , ). The ﬁrst four terms are nonnegative. The gv ii
ﬁnal term has an ambiguous sign. If , this term equals zero; moreover, in v p 0 i
that event it must be that because we are considering only nonzero pairs g 1 0 i
( , ), and this in turn implies that the second term is positive, so (A1) must gv ii
be positive. Suppose instead that . In this case, the ambiguous ﬁnal term v 1 0 i
combined with the fourth term, , can together be shown to be pos- b(v)b(0) ii i
itive. Given that at any optimum, we have
   b(0) 1 (1 m)p b(0)v 1 p(1 m)v ≥ ii i i i i
. Moreover, because and
   p(1 m)vF(g v) b(v)b(0) ≥ b(0)v b(0) 1 0 ii i i i i i i i i i
. Therefore, , so the two terms com-
   b (0) ≥ 0 b(v)b(0) 1 p(1 m)vF(g v) ii i i i i i i i
bined are positive, and (A1) must be positive in this case as well.
Parts b and c.—To prove these parts, it sufﬁces to construct an example for
each claim. For all the claims except the latter claim of part c, that virtue may
not always be experienced, we consider an example in which , so that V p 0
virtue cannot be used. Furthermore, we choose an example in which the con-
straint on guilt (2) is not binding. To ensure this, suppose that u never exceeds
1, so that cannot exceed 1. (As is sufﬁcient to deter any act, no higher g* g p 1 ii
can be optimal on any subset because the only effect of raising above 1 gS g ii i
would be to increase inculcation costs.) Now,assumethat ,sothatconstraint G 1 1
(2) cannot be binding and thus . For the remainder of the example, we l p 0
conﬁne attention to a particular subset . Assume that the distributions of u Si
and of h on are independent, so that . For u, Sf (g v, h) p f (g v)f (h) ii i i i 1 ii i 2
assume a triangular distribution on [1, 1] such that and f (1) p f (1) p 0 i1 i1
. For h, assume a distribution that is positive on (0, 2) and has a mean f (0) p 1 i1
of 1. Let , and let be constant and equal to 0.0375. Now, using the
  p p 0.1 a i
ﬁrst-order condition (5) for and moving to the denominator on the g* 1 0 p ii
20 When writing (A1) we ﬁnd it convenient, with respect to using expression (1) for
, to state and separately, taking advantage of the fact that and are constants Wg v g v ii i ii
when integrating with respect to u and h.512 journal of political economy
right side, we have . The
2 1(1 g )(1 0)[1(0.5g 0.5g )] p 0.0375/0.1 ii i
solution to this is .
21 Part c, that guilt may sometimes be experienced, g* p 0.5 i
is true because, whenever , the act is committed and guilt is therefore u 1 0.5
experienced. Part b is also true. That undesirable acts may be committed follows
because, as just noted, all acts for which are committed, but for any such u 1 0.5
u, some situations will be such that because the distribution of h is positive h 1 u
(and independent of u) on (0, 2). That desirable acts may be deterred follows
because all acts for which are deterred, but for all acts such that , u ≤ 0.5 u 1 0
there will be situations in which . h ! u
Finally, to show that it is possible that but virtue may not be experienced v* 1 0 i
when situations in arise, we can construct a different type of example. Suppose Si
that there is only one subset (with probability 1). Suppose further that , G p 0
so that guilt cannot be used. In addition, assume that h is distributed indepen-
dently of u and has a mean of 1; the cumulative distribution of u on this single
subset , ; , ; and .
22 First, observe F(0.1) p 0.99 F(1) ! 1 b(0.1) ! 0.2 b(1) 1 1 V 1 1
that . This is necessarily true because welfare at exceeds welfare v* 1 0 v p 0.1
at (and is feasible since ): Raising v from 0 to 0.1 involves v p 0 v p 0.1 V 1 1
an inculcation cost less than 0.2, deters 0.99 of the acts and thus causes a total
loss in conventional utility of less than 0.1 (since each deterred act is such that
) and avoids harm of 0.99 (since the mean of h is 1). Second, observe u ≤ 0.1
that . The reason is that the inculcation cost at exceeds 1, which in v* ! 1 v p 1
turn exceeds the maximum possible beneﬁt from avoiding harm, which equals
1, so total welfare at is less than that at . Finally, this implies that, v p 1 v p 0
even though , virtue will not always be experienced, for there are situations v* 1 0
in which , where the act is committed (because and ), and thus u 1 1 v ! 1 g p 0
virtue is not experienced.
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